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Abstract: This paper examines both the determinants and the effects of changes in the rigidity of 
labor market legislation across countries over time. Recent research identifies the origin of the 
legal system as being a major determinant of the cross-country variation in the rigidity of 
employment protection legislation. However, the supporting evidence is largely confined to levels 
of regulation and is almost exclusively based on international cross-section data for the post-1995 
period. This paper introduces a new index capturing the rigidity of employment protection 
legislation (LAMRIG) for an unbalanced panel of more than 140 countries over time starting in 
1960. Although the importance of legal origins in explaining the level of rigidity of labor 
regulations across countries is replicated using LAMRIG, their explanatory power is much 
weakened for changes over time (1960-2004.) More important as determinants of such changes 
are the level of development and other reforms such as trade liberalization. With respect to the 
effects of changes in the rigidity of labor regulations on growth and inequality, which have been 
very controversial in the literature, results with LAMRIG support Freeman’s conjecture that 
changes in rigidity do not systematically affect economic growth but do lower income inequality. 
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I. Introduction 
Structural reforms in the labor market almost inevitably involve changes in employment 
protection legislation (hereafter EPL). Such changes have important consequences in terms of 
economic growth and income inequality. Given that few other structural reforms affect so many 
economic agents (workers, firms, unions, government, and consumers) at the same time and in 
such a comprehensive manner, it is hardly surprising that labor market reforms are implemented 
more slowly and less frequently than other reforms.  
The vast economics literature on EPL has three main features. It mostly (a) focuses on 
richer countries, (b) uses data covering the post-1995 period, and (c) studies levels of EPL, not 
changes. The rationale for these features is that data covering both a large number of developed 
and developing countries and going back in time to well before 1995 are still lacking. 
Consequently, there are very few studies of labor market reforms, that is, of changes in EPL over 
time as opposed to levels of EPL at one point in time. The objective of this paper is to introduce a 
new EPL index covering more than 140 countries in 5-year averages since 1960. The new EPL 
index is called LAMRIG, short for an index of labor market legislation rigidity. 
There is heated controversy over the effects of labor market reforms. The conventional 
view is that such reforms (for example, by lowering dismissal costs) increase social welfare and 
improve economic performance (MacLeod, 2011). Yet Freeman (2010), among others, highlights 
the difficulties in identifying the economic growth implications of changes in labor market 
institutions and points out that such reforms may instead increase income inequality. In addition, 
Acharya et al. (2010) argue that innovation and growth may be fostered by stringent labor laws, 
especially in innovation-intensive sectors because investments in worker training and employee 
loyalty may be greater in situations where labor is more protected. Hence, it is also plausible that 
higher levels of worker protection can be beneficial in terms of economic growth.  
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Since labor market reforms are not necessarily exogenous, it should be clear that 
evaluations of their effects can benefit from a deeper understanding of the factors determining 
changes in EPL. The origin of a country’s legal system is a widely accepted explanation for labor 
market rigidity.1 If employment laws were in fact invariant over time, it would be easy to see how 
legal origins (which themselves are also quite naturally invariant with respect to time) and labor 
regulations could be closely related. However, if these laws can be shown to change over time 
and other factors can be identified as contributing to these changes, then endogenizing 
employment protection can genuinely contribute to the analysis of its effects.  
The seminal paper in the empirical literature on the rigidity of employment protection 
legislation is Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer (2004, hereafter BDLLS.) 
They constructed an index of labor market legislation rigidity based on the provisions of the labor 
laws for about 85 countries around the year 1997. They also construct two related indexes 
covering collective relations laws and social security laws. They examine the relevance of 
various proxies for efficiency, political and legal origin theories in explaining the variations in the 
EPL index across countries and conclude that the legal origins explanation dominates the other 
explanations. On average, countries that have labor regulation embedded in the English common 
law system have less restrictive labor laws and regulations than those based on French or other 
civil law systems. The intuition is that the main difference between the English common law and 
French or other civil law systems is that the latter are associated with more rigid, more detailed, 
more complicated, all-encompassing labor laws which are more difficult to change (i.e., less 
flexible). As a result, the English common law countries have simpler and more flexible labor 
laws which facilitate the abilities of firms and workers to adjust to shocks.  
In recent years, various alternative indicators of labor market rigidity (or flexibility) have 
                                                     
1 For theoretical underpinnings see Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2008).  
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been proposed.2 These indexes have been based on various kinds of measures: (1) measures 
based on market outcomes, such as the extent of labor turnover, the number of strikes, labor force 
participation rates, unemployment rates, (2) measures of job satisfaction,  the competiveness of, 
or the extent of discrimination in, labor markets based on subjective opinion surveys of 
employers, workers or other parties, (3) tax wedges (distortions measured in terms of the gap 
between what workers receive and employers pay) and (4) codified characterizations of various 
features of  the labor laws and other labor market regulations (BDLLS, 2004).   Each approach 
has, of course, advantages and disadvantages.  
This paper attempts to extend the individual rights and law-based component of the BDLLS 
approach in several ways, chiefly, by improving the country coverage and extending it both 
backwards from the late 1990s (wherever possible to the early 1950s) as well as forward to 2000-
2004. These extensions allow the study of the dynamics of labor market reforms across a fairly 
large number of both developing and developed countries. We construct a single relatively 
comprehensive measure of labor market rigidity based on comparisons of labor laws across 
countries and over time. Our index  (LAMRIG) is an employment laws rigidity index designed to 
be as consistent as possible with the cross country comparisons of  the seminal BDLLS (2004) 
paper and with the studies that have attempted to update it (World Bank's Doing Business 
project). Our LAMRIG index is a purely de jure index measure of the rigidity of employment 
laws. Our extension increases the number of countries to 145 for at least one time period and to 
approximately 130 countries for the panel dimension (5-year averages from 1960-64 to 2000-04.)   
Constructing such an index for so many countries over such a long period provide an 
opportunity to examine the both the determinants and effects of changes in employment law 
rigidity in the somewhat longer run. Our main findings using this new index are as follows. We 
                                                     
2  Employment protection legislation can also be thought of as one important labor market institution, among for 
example active labor market policies, unemployment benefits and unions.  
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find that employment protection legislation is prevalent across the world, that its levels do change 
over time, and that legal origins turns out not to be the most important explanation for these 
changes. With the analysis of the determinants of the rigidity of labor market regulations 
restricted to the cross-section for 1995-1999 (the period coinciding with that in BDLLS, 2004), 
we can replicate these results, that is, we show the greater importance of legal origins than that of 
per capita GDP and/or political factors. Second, when we extend the analysis to the panel and to 
changes over time (treating labor market reforms as changes in the employment protection 
index), our results diverge from those of BDLLS (for instance, in a system GMM model, the 
influence of legal origins disappears.) Third, to models of labor market reform that reflect the 
legal, efficiency and political theories, we also add various other factors suggested by the extant 
political economy of reform literature. These include economic crises, structural factors and other 
structural reforms. Along with the reduced role of legal origins, we find evidence suggesting that 
countries with lower per capita GDP tends to show lower levels of LAMRIG. We also find that 
economic crisis in the form of higher unemployment rates tends to reduce LAMRIG (meaning 
lowering the rigidity of such regulations.) More importantly, we find that, while trade 
liberalization in the preceding period tends to deter labor market reform, financial liberalization 
has the opposite effect. Last but not least, we show that our index confirms a result that was 
widely conjectured previously (Freeman, 2010), namely that labor market reform is associated 
with less income inequality but has a weak direct relation to economic growth.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes in detail how LAMRIG is 
constructed. Section III illustrates the use of LAMRIG by describing its changes over time for a 
few selected countries.  Section IV discusses data and methodology to assess LAMRIG more 
systematically, while Section V is devoted to various econometric exercises in this regard.  
Section VI concludes the paper with our suggestions for future research.   
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II. Rationale and Construction of LAMRIG 
In order to study labor market reforms, either their determinants or effects, one needs time series 
data. Yet, the vast majority of existing indicators (1) refer basically to developed economies, (2) 
use data covering the post-1995 period, and (3) tend to focus exclusively on the levels of 
employment protection (even when it is possible to analyses changes over admittedly short, 5 to 
10 years, periods of time.) Before discussing how we constructed a new index that addresses 
these three limitations, it is important to briefly review the existing alternatives.   
A well-known alternative index is that by Forteza and Rama (2006), and Rama and 
Artecona (2000), which is based on the International Labor Office (ILO) conventions signed by 
each country. The index has good coverage (more than one hundred countries and over time.) 
But, since this index bases much on each country’s having approved of various ILO conventions 
on non-discrimination in employment that may affect who is hired but not the extent to which 
firms can adjust their work force over time. It also has the disadvantage of having almost no 
variation over time since once any or all such conventions have been signed they are unlikely to 
change.  Another possibility is an index akin to that put together by Kucera (2002) concerning the 
rules governing unions and collective bargaining. This is based on sources such as the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the US State Department’s Country Reports 
on Human Rights Practices, and the ILO Reports of the Committee on Freedom of Association.3 
The individual indicators are then weighted by their assumed relative importance and then 
aggregated into an index representing the average of such scores for. Another important source 
                                                     
3 Kucera used some 37 different indicators from these sources, weighted them by their assumed relative importance 
and then aggregated them into an overall index for the period 1993-7. Greenhill et al (2009) distinguished between 
those indicators pertaining to the laws and those pertaining to practice and extended the two sets of indexes 
backward to 1986 and forward to 2002 for 90 developing countries.   They used bilateral trade patterns to show that 
the level of their freedom to organize indexes (especially the laws-oriented one) can be linked to the extent to which 
developing countries export to developed countries with higher labor standards 
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for measures of the degree of regulation of labor markets is the Fraser Institute. Since 1975, they 
score countries on a number of sub-indicators of economic freedom but in 2001 began to include 
six additional sub-components relevant to measuring the freedom of labor markets. While at first 
this was limited to 58 countries, the country coverage has grown somewhat over time. Finally, 
Aleksynska and Schindler (2011) put forward a panel data base of labor market regulations based 
on employment protection legislation, unemployment insurance systems and minimum wage 
regulations for 91 developed and developing countries, yearly but only from 1980 onwards.  
As has been noted in various surveys, for example in Bertola (2009), Djankov and Ramalho 
(2009), and Freeman (2010), the availability of indexes of employment protection legislation for 
countries over time outside of the OECD and Latin America is much more limited. To our 
knowledge, there are only a few indexes that have reasonable cross-country and over time 
coverage going back from the present to the late 1960s or beyond. Aside from the Forteza and 
Rama index of ILO Conventions, almost all of these, e.g., Blanchard and Wolfers (2001), OECD 
(2004), Allard (2005a) do so exclusively for OECD or developed countries.4 For example, the 
Blanchard and Wolfers (2001) study constructs a series for 26 OECD countries going back from 
the 1995-99 period to the 1960s in five year intervals.5  The index constructed by Allard (2005a) 
is consistent over time, is available on an annual basis and with longer time coverage, for 21 
OECD countries.6 It is in principle comparable to those of OECD (2004) and to a large extent 
BDLLS (2004) and subsequently Doing Business, but excludes two subcomponents (delay in the 
                                                     
4  Note that these studies built upon a series of important earlier attempts such Lazear (1990), Grubb and Wells 
(1993), Addison and Grosso (1996), and Nickell (1997.) 
5 Nickell et al (2003) have annualized the Blanchard and Wolfers series. More recently, the European Commission 
has constructed a somewhat similar set of indexes called the Labor Market Reform Database (LABREF) with more 
detail on certain policy-related aspects of labor legislation, but only for each year since 2000 and for EU members. 
These labor market reform indexes include pension, labor taxation and other aspects. Both Arpaia et al. (2007) and 
Bassanini and Venn (2007) describe these indexes and study their impacts. Arpaia (2007) focuses on the effects of 
the indexes on labor market participation (of all workers but especially of older ones) while Bassanini and Venn 
(2007) examine the effects of the indexes on labor productivity.   
6 Allard (2005a) made use of 16 of the original 18 aspects of EPL used in OECD (2004) but obtained the data, not 
from questionnaires cross-checked with the individual countries as in the OECD study, but rather from direct 
examination of the laws themselves based on ILO’s NATLEX supplemented with OECD sources.   
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notification and compensation for unfair dismissal), for which information could rarely be found 
in the legislation.7 Another multi-country source of note with time coverage extending before the 
mid-1990s is Heckman and Pages (2000, 2004.) It covers most countries of the Latin America 
and Caribbean (LAC) region, going back from the late 1990s to the late 1980s.  For the most part, 
these indexes are available at intervals a decade apart, not annually.  Even for OECD and LAC 
data, comparability is made more difficult by the fact that, although similar in spirit, e.g., the 
Heckman and Pages (2000 and 2004) Job Security Index (JS) and the Allard (EPL) index are 
built up from sources, methods and index aggregation procedures that are by no means identical. 
The Heckman and Pages JS is defined as the discounted value of dismissing a worker at an 
expected date in the future based on the likelihood and costs of dismissal implied by the labor 
laws and regulations (but excluding the costs of court actions).8 This corresponds (imperfectly) to 
the Firing Cost dimension of the BDLLS Employment Laws Index. Both the scoring of the 
individual components and their weighting into the various sub-indexes and further into the 
overall indexes has been controversial since virtually any method is subjective.9  
Unfortunately, none of these indexes reflects by any means all of the labor market 
institutions (such as wage flexibility, team production, job rotation, social dialogue, pension plans 
of different types, and workers use of the courts) that one might think could exercise influence on 
economic outcomes of various sorts (Freeman 2010).10 Yet, each of them captures a number of 
important dimensions of labor regulations and thus may be regarded as a measure of the 
restrictiveness of labor laws and regulations for firms in their use of labor.   
                                                     
7 Acharya et al. (2010) use the Deakin et al. (2007) index, which, although substantially more comprehensive, is only 
available for the U.S., U.K., France, Germany and India. 
8 It assumes a common discount rate of 8 percent, a turnover rate of 12 percent  and the country and period-specific 
cost (inclusive of those related to seniority) of dismissing a worker for either justified or unjustified reasons. 
9 Indeed, as shown by Addison and Teixeira (2003), the various variants of the aggregate indices that have arisen are 
not always highly correlated and their application to issues like unemployment rates has sometimes resulted in 
opposite findings. These and other authors also point out that what is relevant in constructing these indices may also 
vary from industry to industry.  
10 Allard (2005b) creates (for the same 21 OECD countries in her 2005a EPL) indexes of unemployment benefits 
based in part on tax treatment and subsidies and the duration and the conditions for qualification.  
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  The remainder of this section describes the construction of our index of labor market 
legislation rigidity (LAMRIG.) The data construction exercise was made possible in large part by 
the on-line availability of comprehensive databases of labor laws, especially NATLEX.11 
LAMRIG is based on two main pillars and its construction follows five steps. One of the two 
main pillars is the Botero et al (2004) index of employment protection legislation,12 which is 
available for 85 countries in year 1997.13 
The second main pillar is NATLEX, the ILO depository of labor laws, which covers more 
than 150 countries since the late 1940s. Notice that NATLEX separates legislation in more than 
20 law categories and for this exercise we focus on those categories that more closely relate to the 
four dimensions of the BDLLS index of employment protection legislation. These  are (a) cost of 
increasing hours worked, (b) cost of firing workers, (c) dismissal procedures and (d) alternative 
employment contracts (part time or fixed term versus regular full-time)). For LAMRIG, we focus 
on the following categories from NATLEX (main sub-categories in parenthesis): Conditions of 
work (“Hours of work, weekly rest and paid leave”),  Employment security, termination of 
employment,  Conditions of employment (“Labour contracts”, “Wages” and “Personnel 
management”) and General provisions (“Labour codes, general labour and employment acts”). 
The four dimensions of BDLLS employment laws index capture (a) cost of increasing hours 
worked, (b) cost of firing workers, (c) dismissal procedures and (d) alternative employment 
contracts (part- versus fixed-time legal working conditions). The categories we use from 
NATLEX are (main sub-categories in parenthesis): Conditions of work (“Hours of work, weekly 
                                                     
11 NATLEX is freely available at http://natlex.ilo.org/ It is maintained by the International Labor Organization 
(ILO)'s International Labor Standards Department and has extensive and detailed records of most labor laws of more 
than 150 countries since the late 1940s.  The World Law Guide (LEXADIN at www.lexadin.nl) was also used, but 
we found it to be less comprehensive and well-organized than NATLEX. LEXADIN is organized by country (and 
within each country there are relevant entries under “Labor law”.) 
12 The original version of the Employment Laws Index published in BDLLS Employment Laws Index was presented 
in Djankov et al (2003). It has been presented on different scales in different versions of their work.  
13  Another reason for choosing the broader ELR index of BDLLS (2004) as the lynch-pin for our construction of 
LAMRIG is that these authors have shown it to have important consequences for labor market outcomes, perhaps 
stronger ones than have been obtained by other authors (La Porta et al., 2008).  
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rest and paid leave”),  Employment security, termination of employment,  Conditions of 
employment (“Labour contracts”, “Wages” and “Personnel management”) and General 
provisions (“Labour codes, general labour and employment acts”). 
Based on these two pillars, the construction of LAMRIG follows 5 steps.  
The first step involves compiling the legal information on as many of the relevant 
provisions as possible from NATLEX for around  1997 and establishing how it maps with the 
BDLLS Employment Laws Index for their original 85 countries in the year 1997. Step 2 involves 
using NATLEX and the mapping produced in Step 1 to extend the BDLLS Employment Laws 
Index to about 60 additional countries in 1997.  
Step 3 involves using all the information that could be found on the laws identified 
NATLEX for years before 1997 and up to 2005 following the mapping produced in Step 1 and its 
extension to about 140 countries in 1997, to create the first version of our index of employment 
protection for a panel of more than 140 countries since 1960 in five-year averages. Using the 
NATLEX data, the over-time variations in these indexes are then applied to the country-specific 
1995-9 values in the BDLLS (2004) to construct over time variations in the country-specific ELR 
indexes. A similar procedure is applied to the more fragmentary evidence of over-time changes in 
the relevant components of labor laws for the remaining countries in the samples afforded by the 
BDLLS (2004) and subsequent Doing Business Surveys. In cases where there was no new 
Employment Law between dates covered, such as in Haiti between 1984 and 1995-99, the 
resulting index values were assumed to remain constant between those dates.  
Steps 4 and 5 refer to checks and balances exercises. Step 4 checks whether LAMRIG is 
harmonious with Heckman and Pages (for LAC since the late 1980s), Blanchard-Wolfers and 
Allard (for OECD since 1960), Deakin et al. (2007) and the World Bank Doing Business 
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indicator of labor market rigidity beginning in 2003.14 Step 5 involves checking LAMRIG against 
various individual country studies. Since in some cases one cannot be certain from the Labor 
Laws stored in NATLEX and LEXADIN for earlier years whether these were in fact the original 
laws or those incorporating subsequent amendments, in Step 5 we make use of individual country 
studies that provide quantitative or even qualitative assessments of employment protection 
legislation and changes therein over time. Quite naturally, by its very nature step 5 is 
considerably less systematic and comparable across countries, but perhaps better in some cases as 
far as changes over time are concerned.   
  While others may wish to keep the various sub-indexes separate for use in different kinds 
of application, for the present purposes we keep the focus on a single broad indicator of the 
restrictiveness of employment laws. To some extent this is necessary because information 
relevant to one or more subcomponents was either very fragmentary or excessively subjective but 
we also do so because we think that the more comprehensive overall index may be more 
important in detecting effects or determinants just as BDLLS (2004) had done.    
The end result is a set of scores on our LAMRIG index for well over 100 countries 
measured as 5-year averages ranging from 1950-54 through 2000-04 wherever possible. The 
values of the LAMRIG index range from 0 to 3.5, with higher values reflecting more rigid 
employment protection laws.15 For some years there are as many as 145 countries with LAMRIG 
scores. As has been pointed out by quite a few analysts (e.g., Eichhorst et al. 2007, Freeman 
2010), whether higher scores are looked as desirable or undesirable is subjective. For example, 
employers’ associations and individual employers typically view them as harmful to investment, 
                                                     
14 In particular for the countries not included in the 85 country sample of Djankov et al. (2003) and BDLSS (2004) 
the subsequent Rigidity of Employment (ROE) Indexes (based on mostly the same individual indicators) in the 
World Bank’s Doing Business Surveys for subsequent years 2003 and 2007 were used to cross-check.  
 
15 The minimum values of LAMRIG are for Australia in the 1950s and 1960s, while its maximum values are for 
Spain in the 1980s and 1990s.  
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employment, and productivity. But, those supporting labor interests often see them as good, 
helping to increase the legitimacy of working outside the home for individual workers and 
thereby creating larger and better organized labor markets. Others (Agell, 1999, Boeri et al., 
2000, Nicoletti et al., 2000) view the “goodness” or “badness” of such indexes to be more 
complex, depending on the identity and magnitude of other market imperfections, regulations and 
so on.16 We are agnostic on this issue, but given considerable evidence suggesting that higher 
scores are associated with higher informality or unemployment rates and lower labor force 
participation rates, we use the term “reform” to refer to a reduction in these indexes.    
 
III. Country Examples 
Reasons for the comparative dearth of changes in labor laws were given in our introduction.  Yet, 
although  there are  some countries that have experienced little change in their LAMRIG scores 
over the entire period, in each region there are also countries whose scores have changed 
considerably  from one 5-year period to another, resulting in some interesting differences over 
time as well as across countries and also across regional or other groupings. To illustrate some of 
these patterns, this section compares LAMRIG scores over time in several countries.  
  In their study BDLLS (2004) did something similar in illustrating the relevance of a 
country’s legal tradition in explaining employment law (EPL) rigidity by comparing the values of 
their EPL index for New Zealand and Portugal. By pointing out that the two countries were 
similar in a number of respects including income per capita (at least in the late 1990s) but 
differed in their legal traditions, i.e., New Zealand’s legal system being based on English 
common law and Portugal’s based on French civil law, BDLLS, used this comparison to illustrate 
                                                     
16Some of this literature refers to distinctions which virtually none of the indexes is able to deal with, such as 
potentially important differences in coverage (say across different types of workers, industries or regions) or the 
extent of their implementation and enforcement.  
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their hypothesis that these differences in legal systems are associated with important differences 
in the rigidity of labor laws. In particular, they argued that French civil law (and Socialist law) 
was associated with greater rigidity in labor laws than English common law. As shown in Figure 
1a, according to the corresponding values of these two countries on our index of labor law 
rigidity (LAMRIG), the gap between the two countries in the 1995-9 period is even larger, 2.43 
for Portugal but slightly less than 0.5 for New Zealand. Notice, however, that although this gap 
has been quite large ever since the mid-1970s, in the early 1960s the two countries had almost 
identical index values.17 Clearly, if 1960-4 scores had been used, this comparison would not have 
served the purpose of showing that the civil law tradition gives rise to greater restrictiveness in 
labor legislation than does the common law tradition. Moreover, with such sizeable changes in 
relative rankings over time, it becomes less clear why the legal tradition should matter so much 
since the legal tradition virtually never changes.18    
In order to illustrate some other interesting differences in the index over time in countries 
from outside the OECD, in Figure 1b we show the patterns over time in the LAMRIG indexes for 
three large developing countries, India, China, and Brazil. Note that these countries represent 
three different legal traditions: English, Socialist and French, respectively. All three of these 
countries have had LAMRIG scores that were relatively high for developing countries throughout 
the period. Socialist law China’s LAMRIG started high with a score of 2.0 in the early 1960s but 
declined to 1.42 by 2000-4.19 Common law India’s started at about 1.5 in the early 1960’s (below 
                                                     
17 The dramatic increase in LAMRIG for Portugal in the late 1960s and 1970s coincides with the transition from a 
repressive dictatorship under Salazar (which was closely linked to a group of large conglomerate firms) to a more 
pro-labor dictatorship under Caetano and then in its 1974 revolution to a socialist government (Birmingham, 2003.)  
18 As noted in section 2 above, the OECD is the only relatively large grouping of countries for which one can find 
indexes of the rigidity of labor legislation over time going back to the 1960s (e.g., Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, and 
Allard, 2005.)  For this reason, we have made extensive use of these sources (especially Allard) in constructing 
LAMRIG for this group of countries. Indeed the gap between Portugal and New Zealand is not exclusive to 
LAMRIG but obtains also in these other sources.   
19 Actually, the high score of China in the early years was not explicitly due to a its labor law since it really didn’t 
have one until 1994 but rather to the restrictiveness the rules governing state enterprises, the Industrial Enterprise Act 
of  1986 and the Regulation of Private Enterprise Act of 1988. With the 1994 Labor Act, the use of fixed term 
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the level of China but quite high compared to common law New Zealand) and hardly changed at 
all.20 The failure of India’s relatively high index to decline despite the substantial liberalization of 
trade and product markets that has taken place since the early 1990s may come as a surprise to 
some.21 Finally, French civil law Brazil’s LAMRIG score started high (like China’s) but in fact 
rose  beginning in the late 1980s with the promulgation of a new constitution  in 1988 despite 
having taken many other reforms before declining slightly during the reformist second Cardoso 
term and subsequently with the ascendance of the labor party after 2000.22  
Finally, Figure 1c shows the behavior over time of the LAMRIG scores for a few selected 
developing countries from various regions of the world: Botswana and Zambia from Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Iran and Jordan from the Middle East and the Philippines from Asia. There are quite 
substantial changes in the rigidity of employment protection legislation over time in this group of 
countries.  Iran and Philippines saw their LAMRIG scores rise quite sharply over time.23 Jordan’s 
LAMRIG was steady at a relatively high value of 2.7, before falling substantially in 1995-9 and 
then rising again slightly in 2000-4. Botswana’s LAMRIG scores started rather low at 0.9 in 
1970-4, rose gradually to 1.3 in the 1990s before falling to 1.05. Zambia’s LAMRIG scores 
                                                                                                                                                                            
contract was allowed to a much greater extent and other incentives in labor use were provided to private enterprises 
which were now being encouraged.   
20 Deakin has also noted that the high value of India’s index compared to many developing countries would be 
something of a surprise if one thinks its common law background was the sole or primary determinant. State-specific 
changes to the federal-level Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 are relevant because in India’s federal system states are 
also granted the power to regulate industry, labor, health and other matters. A problem with the state level data is that 
some states were liberalizing while others were tightening regulations, making it difficult to aggregate them into all-
India changes. We did so crudely based on the number of states moving in either direction, the magnitudes of these 
changes and the sizes of the respective states.  . 
21 The comprehensive Deakin et al (2007) index is available for five countries since the 1970s.  The conclusions for 
India using their index are similar to the ones using LAMRIG. Both indexes suggest that the great Indian reforms 
since 1991 bypassed the labour market, focusing instead on trade liberalization, privatization, tax reform and 
macroeconomic stabilization. The political power of the Indian trade unions would seem to help explain this.  
22  Indeed, the loosening of labor regulations under Brazil’s Labor party government came as a considerable surprise 
to many. For discussions of the Brazilian labor laws and their determinants and effects see Amadeo et al (1995), 
World Bank (1991), Barros and Corseuil (2004).  
23 In both cases, these transitions seem to have been related to significant political transitions from extremely 
authoritative regimes supportive of large industrial conglomerates under Reza Pahlavi (the Shah), and Ferdinand 
Marcos, respectively, to regimes of different types but ones more receptive to labor organizations and sympathetic to 
workers. For Iran see Ladjevardi (1985) and Motavaseli and Ghasemi (2006). Similarly, for Jordan see Saif and El- 
Rayyes (2010) and for the Philippines see Villegas (1968) and Sicat (2004.)   
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fluctuate a bit more but remain fairly low over the whole period.24  
In summary, the behavior of the LAMRIG score over time and across countries does seem 
to confirm the commonly held view that these regulations differ fairly considerably across 
countries but in many cases change very slowly over time. However, the LAMRIG scores also 
show that there are cases where the rigidity of the regulations changed sufficiently over time so 
as to reverse earlier rankings, like those of New Zealand relative to Portugal and China relative to 
Brazil and India. While the differences in LAMRIG scores across countries frequently reflect the 
common law, low, French Civil law and Socialist, high, dichotomy suggested by BDLLS (2004), 
with India at the high end of the common law countries and Botswana at the low end of civil law 
countries (though more properly classified as German civil law), the pattern is certainly not 
uniform and, as noted, there are cases of movements in opposite directions over time.  Finally, 
and arguably more importantly, the descriptive analysis above raises important questions about 
the strength and nature of the relationship between origins of the national legal systems (and 
other time-invariant reasons) and employment protection legislation. In the next section we 
systematically evaluate this relationship. 
 
IV. Assessing LAMRIG: Data and Methodology  
In this section we discuss the methodology we choose to assess the applicability of the empirical 
specification used in BDLLS (2004). The purpose is to explain the variability across the larger 
number of countries in our considerably extended LAMRIG index. We then go on to investigate 
its applicability to explaining variations of LAMRIG over time as well. In this latter application 
we draw from a broader list of explanatory variables, including some based on political economy 
                                                     
24 Some early studies identifying the effects of employment laws were Fallon and Lucas (1991, 1993). They 
identified law changes in both India and Zimbabwe that had the effect of tightening labor regulations and claimed 
that in both cases the result was lower formal sector employment of industrial labor.   
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considerations such as crises and structural reforms. 
    Before engaging in any of these extensions, we first need to determine whether or not we can 
replicate the BDLLS (2004) results in a cross-sectional setting. Based on the specification in 
Table IV of BDLLS 20004, p. 1366), the first model we estimate takes the form: 
iiiii LOGDPLAMRIG εββα +++= 21       (1) 
where LAMRIGi is our index of Labor Market Legislation Rigidity for country i, GDPi  is the log 
of per capita GDP at the beginning of each 5-year period, and LOi  is a set of dummy variables for 
each legal origin dummy (French, German, and Scandinavian civil law, Socialist and English 
common law) for country i. BDLLS estimate this model by OLS with robust standard errors and 
data for the 85 countries in their sample for the year 1997. They find that legal origins are a much 
more important determinant of labor market reform than per capita GDP. They argue that this 
result favors the legal theories of institutional changes (and, by the same token, belittles the two 
other theories they identify, the efficiency and political theories.25)   
 We then subject this baseline model to various extensions. These extend it to applying the 
model to explain changes in the LAMRIG indexes over time, to dividing the sample into OECD 
and non-OECD countries26, and into the pre- and post-1980 time periods.27   
The second step is to utilize estimation strategies that are able to fully exploit the panel 
feature of the data. While the use of a fixed-effects estimator would be a natural starting point, 
since the most important variables, legal origins, are time-invariant in BDLLS (2004, our starting 
point is the following random-effects model:  
itiitit LOGDPLAMRIG εββα +++= 21       (2) 
                                                     
25 They associate per capita GDP with the efficiency theories, and factors such as democracy, autocracy, and 
proportional representation with the political theories. 
26 The rationale for this is that richer countries may face quite different political and institutional constraints in 
modifying their labor laws than poorer countries. 
27 This split is motivated by the fact that 1980 marked the beginning of a period of considerably greater economic 
reform in countries around the world than in preceding years.  
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where again LAMRIGit is our index of Labor Market Legislation Rigidity for country i at period t. 
The subscript t refers to a 5-year period, where the measure is the average over the whole period. 
Nine five year periods are included, beginning with 1960-1964 and concluding with 2000-4. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Using the random-effects estimator, we once 
again split the sample into two groups, first, into OECD and non-OECD countries, and second 
into pre- and post-1980. 
While the above specifications refer to the levels of LAMRIG, reform is better thought of 
as changes in these levels. This naturally leads to a third step in the estimation strategy, namely, 
to estimate changes in levels of LAMRIG. Since it is likely that the level of the index (because of 
reform momentum or inertia) may affect the likelihood and magnitude of reform in the next 
period, we first add a one-period (i.e. 5 year) lag of the dependent variable to the baseline 
BDLLS model.  
ittiiittiit XLOGDPLAMRIGLAMRIG εββββα ++++∆+=∆ −− 1,4321,1     (3)  
where ∆LAMRIGit is the change in our index for country i between period t and period t-1, with 
periods defined as before. This model will be estimated at first using the random-effects with 
standard errors clustered at the country level and later using the Blundell-Bond System GMM 
estimator appropriate for models like this where the lagged dependent variable appears on the 
right hand side of the equation.   
Finally, we re-estimate this dynamic model by adding variables covering four different 
groups of factors (in Xi, t-1) namely, political factors, economic shocks, structural factors and 
other reforms, all lagged one period. This is not only to minimize endogeneity concerns but also 
to avoid the problem that could arise because of the somewhat lengthy time period covered by a 
single observation, wherein a change in LAMRIG occurring early in the period could be affected 
by a change in any of the explanatory variables occurring later in the same period  
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Aside from the LAMRIG index as described above, the data for the other two variables in 
the baseline model, GDP per capita and legal origins, are taken from the Penn World Tables and 
the legal origins classification provided in BDLLS (2004). For the structural variables included in 
the model, namely, the share of government expenditures in GDP, the ratio of foreign aid to 
GDP, the share of natural resource exports in total exports and the share of agriculture in GDP, 
we make use of data from World Development Indicators.  
For economic crises we include several different measures, namely, the largest single year 
GDP fall in percentage points that occurred in each five-year period (Max fall GDP), the number 
of years of negative GDP growth (between zero and five) for each 5-year period), the current 
account balance (CAB)28, the number of years in a debt crisis within each five year period (Debt 
Crisis), and a dummy variable for periods in which annual inflation was above 50%.   
Regarding political factors, we focus on the following indicators. The first group comprises 
count variables for both the assassination of important political leaders and general strikes during 
each five year period. Both of these variables originate from Banks (2005). The second group 
comprises the democracy measure (from the POLITY IV data set) and also the Political 
Constraints Index (POLCON) provided by Henisz (2000). The Polity IV democracy variable is 
used to control for relative levels of democratic freedoms (coded on a 1 to 10 scale, with 10 
indicating the highest level of democracy). With stronger democracy, the median voter is 
expected to exercise more influence. Yet, because the median voter is more likely to be a worker 
than an employer, the influence of democracy on labor market liberalization may be ambiguous. 
POLCON measures the number of veto points in a political system, the expectation being that the 
more potential vetoes which need to be circumvented, the less likely it is that labor market 
reforms will be adopted. The third and last group contains a measure of the intensity of civil war 
                                                     
28 CAB is an inverse measure of crisis.  
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and of the intensity of international armed conflicts. Data for constructing these measures is from 
the Correlates of War project at the University of Michigan.  
 We also investigate the role of other structural reforms – in particular, financial and trade 
liberalizations - in affecting the probability and magnitude of labor market reform.29 We proxy 
financial reform by two measures: the share of credit to the private sector in GDP, and an index 
of financial development that reflects not the overall size of the financial system but its efficiency 
levels. In the case of trade liberalization, we use four different measures. One is the length in 
years of uninterrupted trade liberalization,30  another is a measure of trade openness from PWT 
(openk, exports plus imports as a share of GDP). A third is the trade liberalization index 
developed by Campos, Nugent and Hsiao (2010), which represents an extension of the Sachs and 
Warner (1995) measure of trade openness.31 Given the powerful critiques by Rodrik and 
Rodriguez (2001) of the trade openness index of Sachs and Warner (1995), we incorporate these 
views in this modified measure of trade reform, especially with respect to the way the export 
marketing boards (XMB) component of “open” was calculated and the threshold of tariff rates 
distinguishing an “open” from a “closed” economy.32  The fourth measure is the black market 
premium (BMP) in the exchange rate.   
 
                                                     
29 On the relationship between trade liberalization and labor market reform see Fajnzylber and Maloney (2005), and 
references therein. For financial reform and labor market reform, see Pagano and Volpin (2008). 
30 From Appendix 2-B of Wacziarg and Welch (2008). 
31 This was already corrected and extended from 1970-1989 to 1990-99 by Wacziarg and Welch (2008). More 
specifically, these authors defined a country as closed (i.e., open =0) if it had any one of the following: (1) an 
average tariff rate of 40 per cent or more, (2) non-tariff barriers covering 40 per cent or more of trade, (3) a black 
market exchange rate that is depreciated by 20 percent or more relative to the official exchange rate, (4) a state 
marketing agency or board for major exports, and (5) a socialist economic system (as defined by Kornai 1992).  
32 Rodriguez (2006) pointed out that not all export marketing boards are distortive in the sense of discriminating 
against producers for export markets. For this reason, in our construction of the XMB component of  open we take 
advantage of more recent information on XMBs (from World Bank and other sources) that distinguish between those 
marketing boards that in practice discriminate against producers for export and those which do not, as well as some 
of their other suggestions. With respect to the tariff rate threshold we follow Warcziarg and Welch (2008) in using a 
lower tariff rate threshold (20% instead of the 40% in the original S-W) to distinguish “open” from “closed”.32 Since 
most countries in the world had fallen below the 40% threshold by the mid- 1990s, this change has the effect of 
giving more weight to tariff barriers in the classification, something which had led Rodrik and Rodriguez (2001) to 
argue that the tariff component was actually playing virtually no role in the Sachs-Warner open measure.  
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V.  Determinants of LAMRIG and Its Implications for Growth and Inequality  
Next we turn to an assessment of the ability of these alternative models to explain variation in 
LAMRIG both across countries and over time. Given that the lynch-pin for our construction of 
LAMRIG was the BDLLS (2004) data set for 85 countries circa 1997, we begin our assessment 
in Table 1 by trying to replicate the findings in their Table IV (2004, p. 1663). That table relates 
their ELR index to the log of per capita GNP, and dummy variables for Socialist, French, 
German and Scandinavian legal origins (English Common Law being the omitted legal origin 
type). Their results for a sample of 85 countries in 1997 are reported in column (1) of Table 1.  
As can be seen, the explanatory power of the model was high and although the income per capita 
measure was insignificant, the four legal origin dummy variables had highly significant positive 
effects on ELR. This supported their main claim that legal theories provide a much better 
explanation for the observed variation in employment protection legislation across countries than 
efficiency theories.  
In column (2) of Table 1 we repeat their analysis to explain variations in LAMRIG for the 
same year (actually for a cross-section of countries in the 1995-1999 period) but using a larger 
sample of 142 developed and developing countries. Notice now that the effect of income per 
capita is negative and significant (providing more support for the efficiency theory) but the 
effects of all four legal origin dummy variables have even stronger positive and highly significant 
effects on LAMRIG (again supporting the legal origins theory).33  
However our more fundamental extension of the BDLLS dataset is the extension over time 
going back to the early 1950s with a pooled panel data now consisting of more than 850 
observations. Given that in the 1950s, 1960s and even 1970s, the rigidity of employment 
                                                     
33 This result may not seem entirely surprising when one considers that our LAMRIG index is available for 142 
countries (compared to BDLLS’s original 85 countries) with most of the difference accounted for by lower income 
countries. Yet, we should not underestimate the implications of this because the results with these poorer countries 
included challenge the supremacy of the legal origins explanation (considering the many other institutional 
phenomena to which it has been applied). 
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protection legislation was rising, before stabilizing and declining in some cases in recent years, in 
columns (3) and (4) we break the sample into pre and post-1980 observations.  While these are 
very similar for the French and German legal origins, there are some notable differences in other 
respects. Using the between-effects panel estimator, the negative coefficient of the Log Per 
Capita GDP is again statistically significant in both periods but quite a bit larger in the pre-1980 
sample. On the other hand, the impact of the Scandinavian dummy is larger (and statistically 
significant) in the post 1980 sample.34  
Columns (5) and (6) show results obtained by splitting the sample not by time period but by 
income level, i.e., into OECD and non-OECD subsamples. Notice that in our case, in contrast to 
BDLLS, the non-OECD sample is considerably larger than the OECD sample. While once again 
the various Civil Law dummies are shown to have significant positive influences in both samples 
(when there is sufficient variation of these variables in the sample to allow coefficients to be 
estimated), the French Legal Origin dummy has a weaker effect in the non-OECD countries than  
in the OECD sample emphasized by BDLLS. The most striking difference between the samples, 
however, is the difference in the effect of per capita GDP, large and positive in the case of the 
OECD sample, but negative and significant in the non-OECD sample. These results suggest that 
employment protection legislation tends to be more rigid among the richer countries in the OECD 
but less rigid among the richer countries outside of the OECD.   
Given the aforementioned absence of change over time in the legal tradition upon which 
each country’s legal system is based,  if fixed effects were used to account for unmeasured, non-
changing influences, the parameters for legal origin dummies could not  be estimated. We 
proceed in the rest of our empirical analysis to estimate not the levels of LAMRIG but rather the 
changes in LAMRIG.  We start estimating the relationships in the LAMRIG panel with random 
                                                     
34 We have also run these specifications for each 5-year period. We find that it is only for the 1960-64 and 1965-69 
cross-sections that the coefficients on the legal origins are not statistically significant.   
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effects and standard errors clustered at the country level with equation (3) above.  
Table 2 reports the results obtained for changes in LAMRIG first for the full sample (an 
unbalanced panel of 855 observations) and then for the same subsamples as in Table 1. Because 
the dummy variables used to capture legal origins vanish when we use the fixed-effects estimator, 
instead we report results using the random-effects estimator.35 Once again, we find considerable 
variation across samples in the effects of per capita GDP, positive and significant in the pre-1980 
sample and negative and significant once again in the non-OECD and now also in the OECD 
samples. For the full and post-1980 samples, the coefficient of per capita GDP is not statistically 
significant. With the exception of the Scandinavian Legal Origin dummy (for which there is little 
variation in our sample), the coefficients of the Civil Law Origin variables are no longer positive 
and statistically significant. In fact, they are small but negative and significant in the non-OECD 
sample (a finding that is opposite to that of BDLLS). In general, therefore, when it comes to 
changes over time in employment laws, these results challenge the notion that legal origins 
provide a more powerful explanation than efficiency (per capita GDP).  
Next we turn to an evaluation of the third type of theory about the determination of labor 
market regulations considered by BDLLS, namely, political theories.  The intuition behind these 
theories is that if workers have more political power, they would be able to succeed in getting 
more protective employment laws passed. Workers can further their political power not only 
through traditional organizations (like trade unions and their legal use of strikes), but also 
through other political institutions, such as democratization, constraints on  executive power, and 
in the context of less developed countries even with extreme manifestations in terms of political 
instability (e.g., civil and international wars.) We again investigate the explanatory power of 
                                                     
35 We report estimates from the Blundell-Bond System GMM estimator with Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. 
The results from Arellano–Bond test for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors and from the Sargan test of 
overidentifying conditions are reported at the bottom of each table. As can be seen, by and large, they strongly 
support the validity of the underlying moment conditions. 
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these political theories using the random-effects estimator as in Table 2. Since the results failed to 
provide support for any of these six different political measures but left all other results largely 
unaffected, we do not report these results here. However, since the random effects panel 
estimator fails to deal with the bias and possible inconsistency arising from the correlation 
between the error term and the lagged dependent variable, we repeat estimation of the model with 
the different political measures but using the more appropriate Blundell-Bond System GMM 
estimator. 36 Table 3 reports the results from the latter.  
 Table 3 provides a comparative evaluation of all three theories. For changes in 
employment laws at least, in contrast to BDLLS, the results in Table 3 suggest little support for 
either the political or legal origins explanations. The results for each of the  different political 
measures are presented in the six columns of the table, those for Democracy in column (1),  the 
political constraints index (POLCON) in column (2),  assassinations in column (3), strikes in 
column (4) , and international and civil wars in columns (5) and (6), respectively. Democracy has 
a negative but insignificant effect on the change in LAMRIG as does POLCON (the latter 
reflecting checks and balances). By the same token neither strikes, nor assassinations, nor even 
civil and international wars have significant effects on labor market reforms. Note that in this 
case none of the legal origin dummies have significant effects on the change in LAMRIG. The 
negative and significant effects of per capita GDP (in logs), however, are retained in all but one 
set of estimates. In these estimates, moreover, there is also a positive effect of lagged LAMRIG 
(indicating the importance of labor market reforms inertia) in all specifications. This latter 
finding is consistent with the trends shown in Figure 1.  
Given that neither political factors nor legal origins seem to account for the cross-country 
and over time variation in LAMRIG, it would seem appropriate to consider other potential 
                                                     
36 We tested for non-linearities in the effects of per capita GDP but did not find any supporting evidence. 
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explanations. The political economy literature suggests various interesting candidates (Drazen 
2000, Persson and Tabellini 2000). Tables 4, 5 and 6 examine other factors that have been 
highlighted therein, namely: structural features of the economy, economic crises and other 
structural reforms, respectively.  
Table 4 reports System GMM estimates where the additional variable of interest is one or 
another of the following structural variables: Gini coefficient for income inequality, the 
government share in GDP, the share of foreign aid in GDP, natural resource exports as a share of 
total exports and the share of agriculture in GDP. Except in column (1), where the Income Gini is 
the structural indicator, the effect of the lagged dependent variable is always positive and 
significant and in most cases, the effect of GDP per capita is negative and significant.37 As before 
the legal origin dummies are seldom statistically significant. Table 4 shows, however, that none 
of the individual structural indicators has a significant effect on the changes in LAMRIG.  Notice 
that due to missing observations on these additional variables, the sample sizes are smaller in this 
table, especially in columns (1) and (5).  
In Table 5 we present estimates similar to those of Table 4 for changes in LAMRIG but in 
this case with five different measures of economic crises. Column (1) presents the results when 
crisis is proxied by a debt crisis dummy. Columns (2) –(5) report the results for when the crises 
pertain to inflation rates (above 30% per annum), fall in GDP , the number of years of falling 
GDP within the five year period, and high unemployment, respectively. The effects of Log Per 
Capita GDP are negative and significant in all columns and the only economic crisis variable that 
is found to play a role is, maybe unsurprisingly, unemployment. When unemployment is high it 
tends to lower LAMRIG, i.e., implying loosening of the labor regulations. This is an important 
result for at least two reasons. The first is that it provides some support for the commonly held 
                                                     
37 Because of missing data for this variable, sample size is greatly reduced.  
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view that crises beget reforms but it also introduces some potentially interesting refinements in 
this view: certain types of crises or only specific features of economic crises are conducive to 
economic reforms (Campos, Hsiao and Nugent, 2010). Secondly, the strong association between 
labor market reform and lagged unemployment rates raises important questions to the vast 
literature examining the impact of labor market institutions on labor market outcomes. The latter 
studies often assume not only that labor market institutions do not change over time, but also that 
causality flows in one way only, from institutions to outcomes (unemployment, of course, being 
one of the main labor market outcomes of interest). Other than unemployment, none of the other 
economic crisis variables turns out to have a significant effect on the change in LAMRIG.38  
Finally, in Table 6, to our basic specification we add alternative measures of other types or 
reforms, in each case lagged to try to minimize endogeneity concerns. In columns (1) – (3) we 
present the results for three alternative measures of trade reforms. Column (4) presents estimates 
when the added variable is the black market premium (BMP), an inverse measure of trade reform. 
Columns (5) and (6) present results for two alternative measures of financial market 
reform/development, namely, the share of credit to the private sector in GDP and Financial 
Reform Index, respectively. Again most previous results apply: we find positive effects for the 
lagged change in LAMRIG, negative effects of per capita GDP and no significant effects from 
the legal origin dummies. The effects of the various lagged reform measures are interesting. 
Trade openness as measured by the first two measures in columns (1) and (2) reveal positive and 
significant effects on LAMRIG changes. In the same spirit, an increase in the BMP premium has 
the effect of reducing LAMRIG. Taken together, these results suggest that trade liberalization 
slows down labor market reform.39 By contrast, neither of the two financial reform measures has 
                                                     
38  We have also estimated these specifications separately for each of the legal origin sub-samples. The conclusions 
above about the limited impact of economic crises remain.   
39 On the relationship between trade liberalization and labor market reforms see Agnell (1999), Artuc et al. (2010), 
Cosar (2010),  Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) , Kambourov (2009) and  Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007). 
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a significant effect on changes in LAMRIG.      
We investigated additional potential reasons. Cultural factors provide another explanation 
for the cross-country variation in labor market institutions. Mobility involves substantially higher 
costs in societies in which family ties are stronger. This leads to individuals with stronger family 
ties to support more rigid labor markets or stringent labor market regulations. Alesina et al. 
(2010) present broadly supporting empirical evidence (controlling for legal origins) using World 
Value Surveys data for about 60 countries in two points in time. Using LAMRIG we are able to 
replicate this result, yet only based on less than 100 observations. Another important issue is the 
role of foreign pressure in implementing labor market reform. Our results show that the share of 
foreign aid in GDP does not seem to be an important factor. However, recent research has 
focused on U.S. preferential trade agreements and the role that official petitions play in this 
process (Frundt, 1998). We have collected this information and evaluated how it relates to 
LAMRIG. We find little evidence that the existence of a preferential trade agreement with the 
U.S. or official complaints against violations of international labor conventions are significantly 
related to LAMRIG or to changes in LAMRIG (these results are available upon request.)   
  Finally, we explore the potential implications of this measurement exercise (LAMRIG) in 
terms of economic growth and income inequality. One influential view in the literature has been 
that employment protection legislation has strong effects on income inequality yet their effects in 
terms of economic growth are essentially ambiguous. Freeman notes that “the evidence shows 
that labor institutions reduce the dispersion of earnings and income inequality, which alters 
incentives, but finds equivocal effects on other aggregate outcomes, such as employment and 
unemployment” (Freeman, 2008, p. ). One could easily include economic growth among those 
aggregate outcomes, as Freeman indeed does in a later paper: “cross-country regressions yield 
inconclusive results on the impact of labor regulations on growth” (Freeman 2010, p.) The 
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intuition for the expected inverse relationship between employment protection legislation and 
income inequality is straightforward. Such legislation protects employment (and the income from 
employment) for the majority of the population (employees) against a minority (employers); 
consequently one of the ultimate objectives of that legislation is to keep income inequality in 
check.  However, the relationship between employment protection and growth is ambiguous. On 
the one hand, if employment protection legislation hinders worker mobility and hence supports 
and prolongs inefficient worker-firm matches, then they may well hurt economic growth. On the 
other hand, the effect will be the opposite if employment protection legislation is, for instance, 
associated with innovation (Agell, 1999; Acharya et al.2010.)   
 It should now be clear that previous employment protection indexes can provide at best 
partial support for these hypotheses. Partial to the extent that existing indexes are rarely available 
for the period before the mid-1990s and, when available, they are often restricted to OECD and 
Latin American countries. LAMRIG therefore provides an opportunity to throw some first and 
preliminary light into these issues. It allows us to investigate whether or not there is deeper and 
wider (or maybe more robust) support for these two interesting hypotheses. 
  The first three columns of Table 7 display regressions with the Gini coefficient for 
income inequality as the dependent variable, while columns 4 to 6 have the growth rate of per 
capita GDP as dependent variable. Columns 1 to 3 show that the relationship between 
employment protection and inequality obtains with LAMRIG which is something that, due to 
data gaps in the available labor market indexes, could be said only to a much lesser extent and 
with much less certainty previously. Indeed, this result seems stronger than that obtained by 
Calderón et al (2005). They find no effects from what they call de jure employment protection 
(an index based on acceptance of ILO conventions) on income inequality and find weak effects 
from what they call de facto employment protection. In our case, as shown in Table 7, we find 
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quite strong confirmation that the rigidity of employment protection legislation (LAMRIG) is 
inversely related to income inequality. Column 1 supports this view, accounting for the level of 
development, while column 2 supports this view when allowing for non-linearity in the effects of 
the level of development. In column 3 we also add other controls, the share of government 
expenditures in GDP (as suggested by Calderón et al., 2005), and an index of ethnic 
fractionalization (for the beginning of the overall period, in year 1961). While the latter seems 
strongly and positively related to income inequality, the addition of these controls does little to 
weaken the negative relationship between LAMRIG and income inequality. 
 Columns 4 to 6 display the results of adding LAMRIG to relatively standard growth 
regressions. Note again the caveat that the main goal of our paper is to put forward an index of 
the rigidity of employment protection legislation that is comprehensive in its time and country 
coverage. Hence the results in Table 7 are admittedly less comprehensive and systematic than 
those reported above but  are presented here so as to suggest the potential usefulness of LAMRIG 
in the analysis of economic growth and, hopefully, to motivate further research. The simple 
relationship (in column 4) does suggest an inverse relation between LAMRIG and growth rates,  
implying that more rigid employment protection legislation is associated with lower rates of per 
capita GDP growth. However, the results in columns 5 and 6 show that the addition of standard 
growth determinants (investment, human capital and regional dummies) seems to change the sign 
of this relationship (from positive to negative) as well as turning the coefficient on LAMRIG into 
statistically insignificant. It seems therefore safer to conclude, along with Freeman (2008, 2010) 
but now based on the experience of a substantially larger number of countries and time periods 
that the relationship between employment protection and income inequality seems to be negative, 
while the relation with economic growth seems to be inconclusive.  
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VI. Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
The results presented here are clearly only the beginning of a fuller analysis of the determinants 
of levels of and changes in employment protection legislation across countries and over time. We 
would like to further examine the robustness of the results, e.g., in view of the differences in 
some of the effects between pre and post 1980 samples and between OECD and non-OECD 
samples, once the more comprehensive specifications of Tables 4-6 are employed Yet, with the 
data available at present, because most such specifications would greatly reduce the number of 
observations, these extensions may not be promising until data becomes available.   
We believe these findings to be of considerable potential importance to policy-makers and 
to provide useful new evidence for the nascent academic literature on the determinants of labor 
market reforms. With respect to policy, the emphasis on legal origins clearly leaves little room 
for maneuver. Irrespective of the method of transplantation of the legal, the current legal system 
of a country inevitably depends largely on colonial experience or geographic factors which are 
non-changing over the period of study (La Porta et al. 2008). If labor laws do in fact change over 
time, as our LAMRIG indices show for most countries and quite substantially for some, then it is 
rather obvious that non-changing factors like legal origins cannot be as important as 
demonstrated by BDLLS. By showing that changes in labor market laws are positively related to 
past changes, negatively to income, and unemployment rates and positively to prior trade reforms 
it is clear that policy makers may have more room for maneuver.  In particular, we find that trade 
liberalization in the previous 5-year interval is systematically and negatively related to the 
changes in employment protection legislation in the current period (conditional on per capita 
GDP and legal origins). This finding is consistent with the view that workers react to the process 
of opening up of the economy by voting or lobbying for job protection. This would suggest that 
policy-makers will do well to consider these findings in designing, implementing and sequencing 
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of comprehensive packages of structural reforms. 
Our findings on the inverse relationship between trade liberalization and labor market 
reform also provide new evidence and support for a burgeoning yet recent academic literature. 
There is little disagreement among economists that trade liberalization generates large efficiency 
gains by relocating domestic resources along comparative advantage lines. There is also little 
disagreement that trade liberalization generates winners as well as losers, and this is reflected in a 
large body of evidence on its relationship with poverty (Winters et al 2004) and inequality 
(Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007). Yet, recently attention has been directed to another possible and 
previously overlooked mechanism, the ability (from flexibility) of domestic markets to adjust to  
changes in the economic environment, such as within-country labor and capital mobility (Artuc et 
al. (2010), Cosar (2010), Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) and Kambourov (2009)). Such papers 
provide different ways of thinking about the relationship between trade liberalization and labor 
market reform but all have in common the notion that this is better characterized as an inverse 
relationship. These authors highlight that workers employed in import-competing sectors will try 
to resist trade liberalization since it is they who would have “the most to lose.” One aspect that 
has not figured prominently in these analyses, however, is that jobs in the import-competing 
sectors are generally in the formal sector (or to put it differently, informal sector jobs are mostly 
in non-tradables.) Since employment protection legislation by definition only applies to formal 
sector workers who are largely in import competing sectors, our results provide support for this 
explanation. We suggest that this may explain why trade liberalization tends to set back labor 
market liberalization.  
 With respect to future research, in addition to the additional robustness checks and 
improvements in some of the measures of variables identified above, it is our intent to: 
(a)  Further improve on LAMRIG by digging deeper into the ever-improving 
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availability of information on labor laws over time and across countries for years after 2004 when 
our study terminates,  
(b) Further improve on the underlying components of LAMRIG possibly by following 
the lead of Deakin et al. (2007) and more extensive use of the ILO data, and country specialists, 
(c) Possibly to follow the lead of Deakin et al. (2007), Muravyev (2010) and the 
various other researchers focusing primarily on  OECD and transition countries to annualize the 
data on  LAMRIG as well as the related variables used to explain changes therein over time, 
(d) To extend the use of LAMRIG to examine its effects on labor market outcomes 
and other phenomena as BDLLS and many others have with somewhat smaller data sets.   
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Figure 1. Rigidity of Employment Protection Legislation across Countries Since 1960 
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Table 1 
Regulation of Labor and Legal Origins 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
  
BDLLS  
(2004)  LAMRIG 
Pre  
1980 
Post  
1980 OECD 
Non-
OECD 
Log Per Capita GDP -0.001 -0.0775*** -0.227*** -0.0890** 0.321 -0.0805* 
 [0.0116] [0.0295] [0.0621] [0.0352] [0.382] [0.0413] 
Legal origin dummies:       
         Socialist   0.2943*** 0.721***  0.775***  0.764*** 
 [0.0453]  [0.116]  [0.130]  [0.131] 
        French   0.2474*** 0.462*** 0.610*** 0.509*** 1.098*** 0.393*** 
 [0.0381] [0.0696] [0.113] [0.0781] [0.288] [0.0802] 
        German  0.1553** 0.516*** 0.590*** 0.623*** 0.666 0.621*** 
 [0.0702] [0.116] [0.217] [0.122] [0.397] [0.134] 
        Scandinavian   0.3865*** 0.935*** 0.554** 1.142*** 1.101***  
 [0.0462] [0.110] [0.257] [0.197] [0.325]  
Constant 0.3072*** 1.886*** 2.525*** 1.909*** -2.289 1.849*** 
 [0.1038] [0.247] [0.436] [0.289] [3.300] [0.310] 
Observations 85 142 371 484 222 633 
R-squared 0.44 0.348 0.307 0.360 0.513 0.289 
Notes: Results in column 1 are for comparison purposes: they are OLS estimates taken from Botero et al., Table 
IV (2004, p. 1366). They have their “employment laws index” as dependent variable. Log per capita GDP is 
from the Penn World Tables 6.2 and the legal origins dummies are from Botero et al (2004), with English Civil 
Law as the omitted category. The dependent variable in columns 2-6 is our Index of Labor Market Legislation 
Rigidity (LAMRIG). Columns 3 and 4 report results (panel between estimator) for the sample split in before 
and after 1980, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 report results (panel between estimator) for the sample split in 
OECD and non-OECD countries, respectively. Results are reported for an unbalanced panel of 145 countries 
between 1960 and 2005 (non-overlapping 5-year averages.)  Robust standard errors in brackets, *** denotes 
statistically significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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Table 2 
Changes in the Regulation of Labor and Legal Origins 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
Pre 
1980 
Post 
1980 OECD 
Non-
OECD 
Log Per Capita GDP -0.00223 0.0383*** 0.00351 -0.0521*** -0.00873** 
 [0.00515] [0.0120] [0.00643] [0.0162] [0.00364] 
Legal origin dummies:      
         Socialist   -0.0150  -0.0106  0.00418 
 [0.0359]  [0.0355]  [0.0357] 
        French   -0.00347 0.0185 -0.0186* 0.0488 -0.00982* 
 [0.0106] [0.0196] [0.0112] [0.0301] [0.00570] 
        German  -0.0351 0.00384 -0.0771* 0.0392 -0.0664** 
 [0.0331] [0.0328] [0.0393] [0.0269] [0.0303] 
        Scandinavian   0.0986*** 0.179*** -0.0890* 0.0678**  
 [0.0362] [0.0494] [0.0478] [0.0343]  
Constant 0.0515 -0.223*** -0.00187 0.519*** 0.0848*** 
 [0.0388] [0.0833] [0.0497] [0.139] [0.0272] 
Observations 855 371 484 222 633 
Number of countries 142 100 142 23 119 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the change in the Index of Labor Market Legislation 
Rigidity (LAMRIG). Log per capita GDP is from the Penn World Tables 6.2 and the legal origins 
dummies are from Botero et al (2004), with English Civil Law as the omitted category. Because 
these legal origins variables are time-invariant, we use the random-effects panel estimator with 
standard errors clustered at country level (except in Column 1 where we report the pooled OLS 
estimates for comparison). Columns 2 and 3 report results for the sample split in before and after 
1980, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 report results for the sample split in OECD and non-OECD 
countries, respectively. Results are reported for an unbalanced panel of 145 countries between 1960 
and 2005 (non-overlapping 5-year averages), *** denotes statistically significant at 1%, ** at 5% 
and * at 10%. 
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Table 3 
Changes in the Regulation of Labor, Legal Origins and Political Factors 
 
  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Lag  ∆LAMRIG 0.264*** 0.314*** 0.285*** 0.277*** 0.205*** 0.265*** 
 [0.0636] [0.0582] [0.0632] [0.0648] [0.0794] [0.0542] 
Log Per Capita GDP -0.0347** -0.0504** -0.041*** -0.032** -0.0192 -0.0427*** 
 [0.0147] [0.0202] [0.0141] [0.0140] [0.0137] [0.0156] 
Legal origin dummies:       
         Socialist   0.845 0.862 1.424 1.273 2.622 8.291 
 [2.860] [2.471] [2.820] [3.285] [12.43] [17.21] 
        French   -0.163 0.106 -0.275 -0.214 0.135 -0.759 
 [0.654] [0.597] [0.658] [0.752] [0.370] [1.162] 
        German  0.560 0.627 0.387 0.458 0.230 -0.216 
 [0.556] [0.474] [0.484] [0.552] [1.268] [0.941] 
        Scandinavian   0.336 0.491 0.236 0.297  0.0565 
 [0.401] [0.442] [0.484] [0.464]  [0.767] 
Democracy -0.00108      
  [0.00572]        
Political constraints   -0.0576     
                      (POLCON)  [0.0959]     
Assassinations   0.0367    
   [0.0248]    
Strikes    -0.0113   
    [0.0118]   
International conflict      0.00506  
                           (war)     [0.00995]  
Civil war (intensity)      0.00521 
      [0.00494] 
Constant 0.296 0.273 0.398 0.300 0.0388 0.703 
 [0.278] [0.366] [0.401] [0.327] [0.204] [0.648] 
Observations 711 708 721 721 421 589 
Number of  countries 134 137 137 137 85 103 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.6012 0.7865 0.6458 0.5827 0.7421 0.6251 
Sargan (p-value) 0.6194 0.0350 0.5889 0.1407 0.9986 0.6187 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the change in the Index of Labor Market Legislation Rigidity (LAMRIG). Log 
per capita GDP is from the Penn World Tables 6.2 and the legal origins dummies are from Botero et al (2004), with English Civil 
Law as the omitted category.  We report Blundell-Bond System GMM estimates (with Windmeijer-corrected standard errors in 
brackets.) Democracy and the extent of political constraint variables capture formal political institutions, strikes and 
assassinations reflect ad hoc (violent) attempts at conflict resolution, while civil war and international war capture violent political 
conflict and instability Results are reported for an unbalanced panel of 145 countries between 1960 and 2005 (non-overlapping 5-
year averages), *** denotes statistically significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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Table 4 
Changes in the Regulation of Labor, Legal Origins and Structural Factors 
  
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Lagged ∆LAMRIG -0.00836 0.284*** 0.304*** 0.285*** 0.315*** 
 [0.0981] [0.0646] [0.0758] [0.0587] [0.0983] 
Log Per Capita GDP -0.0780 -0.0333*** -0.0440*** -0.0358*** -0.0127 
 [0.0856] [0.0119] [0.0124] [0.0115] [0.0326] 
Legal origin dummies:      
 Socialist    0.975 0.137 0.850 -0.623 
  [0.923] [0.832] [1.094] [17.07] 
        French    -0.108 0.495 -0.215 -0.923 
  [0.523] [0.473] [0.387] [1.512] 
        German  -0.0199 0.475 1.366 0.369 -0.150 
 [0.584] [0.604] [0.948] [0.551] [1.485] 
        Scandinavian   0.0676 0.425 0.543* 0.342 -0.378 
 [0.462] [0.391] [0.303] [0.324] [1.143] 
Income Gini -0.00258     
 [0.00687]     
Govt Share in GDP  0.000613    
   [0.000977]    
Foreign Aid to GDP   8.11e-05   
    [0.00167]   
Natural Res Exports (%)    0.000672  
    [0.000787]  
Agric Share in GDP     0.136 
     [0.333] 
Constant 0.758 0.241 -0.0184 0.339 0.603 
 [0.672] [0.359] [0.323] [0.253] [1.036] 
Observations 202 726 663 723 472 
Number of countries 107 135 136 139 105 
AR(2) (p-value) n.a. 0.6401 0.6285 0.6779 0.4071 
Sargan (p-value) n.a. 0.3969 0.4016 0.5427 0.4602 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the change in the Index of Labor Market 
Legislation Rigidity (LAMRIG). Log per capita GDP is from the Penn World Tables 6.2 and the 
legal origins dummies are from Botero et al (2004), with English Civil Law as the omitted 
category.  We report Blundell-Bond System GMM estimates (with Windmeijer-corrected standard 
errors in brackets.) The table shows the results from including various important structural factors, 
such as the Gini coefficient of income inequality, the ratio of foreign aid receipts to GDP, the 
percentage of natural resources in total exports, and the share of agriculture in GDP. Results are 
reported for an unbalanced panel of 145 countries between 1960 and 2005 (non-overlapping 5-
year averages), *** denotes statistically significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.    
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Table 5 
Changes in the Regulation of Labor, Legal Origins and Economic Crises 
  
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Lagged ∆LAMRIG 0.275*** 0.291*** 0.267*** 0.259*** 0.315*** 
 [0.0709] [0.0629] [0.0595] [0.0604] [0.0717] 
Log Per Capita GDP -0.0461** -0.0446*** -0.0335*** -0.0328*** -0.0404** 
 [0.0186] [0.0165] [0.0113] [0.0114] [0.0173] 
Legal origin dummies:      
 Socialist   0.229 1.129 1.142 1.245 0.416 
 [1.288] [2.887] [2.694] [2.704] [1.086] 
        French   -0.0660 -0.164 -0.190 -0.210 0.605 
 [0.607] [0.579] [0.636] [0.663] [0.414] 
        German  0.607 0.530 0.570 0.575 0.953* 
 [0.616] [0.451] [0.545] [0.558] [0.577] 
        Scandinavian   0.230 0.324 0.302 0.288 0.689* 
 [0.396] [0.407] [0.416] [0.434] [0.413] 
Debt Crises -0.00115     
 [0.00645]     
High Inflation (>30% p.a.)  -0.0247    
  [0.0211]    
Max Fall of GDP   0.000498   
   [0.00106]   
Years of Negative GDP Growth    -0.00930  
    [0.00956]  
Unemployment ILO     -0.0143*** 
     [0.00516] 
Constant 0.362 0.374 0.293 0.304 0.0266 
 [0.360] [0.286] [0.333] [0.336] [0.302] 
Observations 635 700 742 742 526 
Number of groups (countries) 138 138 139 139 124 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.8672 0.6169 0.6090 0.5904 0.9671 
Sargan (p-value) 0.6531 0.2730   0.4720 0.4351 0.3678 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the change in the Index of Labor Market Legislation Rigidity 
(LAMRIG). Log per capita GDP is from the Penn World Tables 6.2 and the legal origins dummies are from 
Botero et al (2004), with English Civil Law as the omitted category.  We report Blundell-Bond System GMM 
estimates (with Windmeijer-corrected standard errors in brackets.) The table investigates the crises beget reform 
hypothesis by showing results from including various aspects of economics crises, such as a dummy for debt 
crises, output contractions, and high inflation and unemployment. Results are reported for an unbalanced panel of 
145 countries between 1960 and 2005 (non-overlapping 5-year averages), *** denotes statistically significant at 
1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.    
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Table 6 
Changes in the Regulation of Labor, Legal Origins and Trade and Financial Reforms 
  
  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Lagged ∆LAMRIG 0.268*** 0.254*** 0.259*** 0.337*** 0.164* 0.337*** 
 [0.0632] [0.0646] [0.0648] [0.0755] [0.0963] [0.0744] 
Log Per Capita GDP  -0.0600*** -0.0545*** -0.0403*** -0.0620*** -0.089*** -0.0595*** 
 [0.0175] [0.0176] [0.0110] [0.0167] [0.0281] [0.0201] 
Legal origin dummies:       
 Socialist   2.426 0.736 0.799 1.608  0.198 
 [3.723] [1.365] [1.718] [3.370]  [2.092] 
        French   -0.174 -0.405 -0.376 -0.00358 -0.548 0.910 
 [0.635] [0.649] [0.596] [0.766] [1.570] [1.719] 
        German  0.444 0.157 0.0345 0.594 0.212 1.625 
 [0.529] [0.714] [0.851] [0.687] [1.293] [2.214] 
        Scandinavian   0.214 0.197 0.278 0.230 0.0726 0.682 
 [0.402] [0.420] [0.428] [0.654] [0.879] [0.688] 
Wacziarg Openness 0.110**      
  [0.0479]        
 Trade Liberalization  0.0836**     
  [0.0419]     
PWT openk   -0.000125    
   [0.000488]    
BMP    -1.4e-06***   
    [5.27e-07]   
Credit Private Sector     1.89e-08  
            (share of GDP)     [4.80e-08]  
Financial liberalization       -0.0192 
       [0.0819] 
Constant 0.434 0.573 0.522 0.459 0.997 -0.166 
 [0.330] [0.409] [0.365] [0.500] [0.841] [1.127] 
Observations 710 705 703 622 406 658 
Number of countries 125 134 130 118 94 131 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.7472 0.6835 0.5593 0.6728 0.5496 0.9210 
Sargan (p-value) 0.3478 0.2174 0.5101 0.1398 0.0675 0.0345 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the change in the Index of Labor Market Legislation Rigidity (LAMRIG). 
Log per capita GDP is from the Penn World Tables 6.2 and the legal origins dummies are from Botero et al (2004), with 
English Civil Law as the omitted category.  We report Blundell-Bond System GMM estimates (with Windmeijer-corrected 
standard errors in brackets.) The table investigates the role of other structural reforms such as trade and financial 
liberalization.  Results are reported for an unbalanced panel of 145 countries between 1960 and 2005 (non-overlapping 5-
year averages), *** denotes statistically significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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Table 7 
The Regulation of Labor, Income Inequality and Economic Growth 
 
 
 
 
Income inequality  
(Gini coefficient) 
 
Per capita GDP  
growth rates  
 
  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
Lag gini   0.693*** 0.734*** 0.557***    
 [0.0652] [0.0647] [0.0783]    
Log per capita GDP  0.106 -6.289 -6.955    
 [0.461] [4.992] [4.813]    
Log per capita GDP Squared  0.421 0.370    
  [0.294] [0.287]    
LAMRIG -2.353** -2.966** -3.195*** -0.413** 0.204 0.165 
 [1.079] [1.279] [1.195] [0.183] [0.172] [0.160] 
Log Human Capital  0.445 4.310*  0.398 -0.0270 
  [2.208] [2.359]  [0.388] [0.369] 
Government share of GDP    0.0311  -0.0158 -0.0135 
   [0.0373]  [0.0117] [0.0116] 
Ethnic fractionalization    36.91***  -1.263** -0.887* 
   [11.42]  [0.536] [0.533] 
Initial per capita GDP     -0.390*** -1.010*** -0.872*** 
    [0.111] [0.190] [0.178] 
Investment     0.0862*** 0.0659***
     [0.0212] [0.0184] 
Africa dummy      -1.410*** 
      [0.523] 
Latin America dummy      -0.588* 
      [0.357] 
Asia dummy      1.469*** 
      [0.393] 
Constant 15.31*** 51.57*** 31.85* 4.474*** 7.142*** 7.179*** 
 [5.494] [16.54] [18.30] [0.854] [1.205] [1.161] 
Observations 560 560 458 791 641 641 
Number of countries 123 123 85 134 92 92 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the Gini coefficient for income inequality (source is the 
UNU/WIDER database), while the dependent variable in columns 4 to 6 is the growth rate of per capita 
GDP (source is PWT 6.2). LAMRIG is our Index of Labor Market Legislation Rigidity. Log per capita GDP 
is from the Penn World Tables 6.2. Results are reported for an unbalanced panel between 1960 and 2005 
(non-overlapping 5-year averages), *** denotes statistically significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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Appendix table 
Basic statistics 
 
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
Lamrig              1130    1.471636    .5858954          0   3.500000 
Change in Lamrig     988    .0320053     .157444   -.816098   1.218311 
Log per capita GDP  1143    7.432279    1.273142   4.586063    10.5654 
 
Legal origins dummies: 
  English           1722    .2967091    .4569285          0          1 
  French            1722    .4570267    .4982946          0          1 
  Socialist         1722    .0824623    .2751476          0          1 
  German            1722    .1039489    .3052829          0          1 
  Scandinavian      1722    .0319396    .1758904          0          1 
 
Political factors: 
  Democracy(Polity) 1326    3.449409    4.123986          0         10 
  POLCON            1105    .2656337    .3211394          0   .8927382 
  Strikes           1311    .1471269    .3803482          0       4.25 
  Assassinations    1311    .1973303    .6110681          0        7.4 
  Civil war          999    .7087921    1.647277          0       15.8 
  International war  759    .2714097    .7267143          0        3.6 
 
Structural factors: 
   Agr share GDP     810    .4671567    .2866302       1.08   96.96718 
   Gini income ineq  348    39.89631    10.06283      19.74       62.9 
   Aid to GDP       1071    4.682741    7.832373    -.05975   54.90643 
   Govt share GDP   1477    18.36703    10.65375   1.382669   70.71793 
   Nat resources    1560    15.02325    27.81068          0        100 
 
Economic crises:  
   Max GDP Fall     1574     .364676    .7170062          0          4 
   Years GDP fall   1574    1.797008    5.131572          0      63.94 
   Inflation crisis 1106    .0669078    .2499752          0          1 
   Debt crisis       956    .2050209    .5032001          0          3 
   Unemployment      662    7.935039    6.163291        .08       43.5 
 
Trade and financial reforms: 
  Wacziarg openness 1445    .2823529    .4397809          0          1 
  CNHsiao openness  1236    .4080502    .4768507          0          1 
  PWT open          1132    65.00167      49.622   4.31e-09   344.8631 
  BMP               1099    217.7605    3179.031  -90.51984      91054 
  Credit priv sect   608    4288.758    61499.38    .014281    1027946 
  Financial dev     1082    .7622988    .3001664          0          1 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------- 
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